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THE SWELLING TIDE OF COMMERCIALIZED AMATEUR
ATHLETICS: HOW GROWING REVENUES HAVE
CALLED PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE
NCAA AND ITS MEMBER
UNIVERSITIES’ TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
I. AN INTRODUCTION: BALANCING ATHLETES’ CONTRIBUTION
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION

TO A

The group of companies earning revenues of at least one billion dollars introduced a new member to their ranks in 2017, when
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) grossed this
threshold for the first time in its history.1 The bulk of the NCAA’s
revenue is collected through contractual relationships the organization has with media companies, such as CBS Corporation and Time
Warner Inc.’s Turner Sports, to broadcast the annual men’s basketball tournament, March Madness.2 As the NCAA’s bank account
has grown substantially, many of the NCAA’s member universities
have experienced simultaneous monetary growth in their respective
athletic programs, particularly in their football and men’s basketball programs.3
The top twenty-five university football programs netted an average of roughly one hundred million dollars in estimated revenue.4
This figure includes revenue produced from ticket sales, licensing,
1. See Bloomberg, The NCAA Raked in Over $1 Billion Last Year, FORTUNE (Mar.
7, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/03/07/ncaa-billion-dollars/ [https://
perma.cc/N3KK-3KZX?type=image] (observing NCAA’s growth in revenue during
fiscal years from 2016 to present equals over one billion dollars while NCAA’s accumulated profits equate to roughly one million dollars).
2. See id. (discussing $761 million NCAA generated from contractual relationships to broadcast March Madness).
3. See Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams: Texas A&M Jumps to
No. 1, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2018/09/11/college-footballs-most-valuable-teams/#73b3a026c647 [https:/
/perma.cc/TB4F-9ABC] (highlighting large revenues which university football
programs collect); see also David Kenyon, College Sports Programs With the Highest
Revenues, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2795760-college-sports-programs-with-the-highest-revenue [https://perma.cc/
R3GX-7G7Q] (describing top ten highest revenue generating football programs);
Chris Smith, The Most-Valuable College Basketball Teams, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2019, 6:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2019/03/12/the-most-valuablecollege-basketball-teams/#58e3411f3225 [https://perma.cc/5UBB-8MT5] (discussing top revenue generating men’s college basketball teams).
4. See Smith, supra note 3 (reporting revenues for highest twenty-five college
football programs collected from annual financial filings).
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royalties, television revenue, and contributions from alumni.5 Also
contributing to revenue are sponsorship agreements with apparel
companies such as Nike and Adidas, which supply university football programs with anywhere from approximately three to seven
and a half million dollars annually.6
Along with collecting exploding revenues, universities have
constructed state-of-the-art athletic facilities that go far beyond
traditional collegiate athletic accommodations.7 Louisiana State
University, for example, built a new twenty-eight million dollar
locker room, which the athletic department described as “a cross
between a first class cabin on an airplane and a space station from a
science fiction film.”8 Revenue increases have also created a spike
in head coaching salaries, specifically for football and men’s basketball coaches.9 The is evident through the University of Kentucky’s
contract with men’s basketball coach John Calipari and the University of Alabama’s contract with football coach Nick Saban, both of
which are worth approximately eight million dollars.10

5. See id. (describing revenue activities of university football programs).
6. See Daniel Kleinman, The Most Valuable College Apparel Deals 2018, FORBES
(Sept. 11, 2018, 9:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2018/
09/11/the-most-valuable-college-apparel-deals-2018/#4b1ca67a4be9 [https://
perma.cc/3EXS-NWDV] (describing various apparel deals reached by universities
such as Clemson University and University of Washington).
7. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish Athletic Facilities, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 23, 2015, 6:40 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.
com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222-story.html [https://
perma.cc/HAD6-C5TM] (highlighting increasing magnitude of spending by universities on athletic facilities).
8. Mack DeGeurin, Louisiana State University Just Spent $28 Million on a Football
Locker Room, and It’s Made a Lot of Students Unhappy, INSIDER (July 23, 2019, 3:26
PM), https://www.insider.com/lsu-spent-28-million-on-a-locker-room-and-students-arent-happy [https://perma.cc/28P7-9G7V] (describing Louisiana State
University’s new twenty eight million dollar football locker room features, including sleep pods for players, purple plush chairs, and offices).
9. See Jason Belzer, Making Sense of College Coaching Contracts, ATHLETIC D IRECTOR U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/making-sense-of-collegecoaching-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/CD2B-A65T] (discussing increasing
amounts of college athletic coaches’ salaries and contracts).
10. See College Football’s 25 Highest-Paid Coaches, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2018, 12:31
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/sports/ncaaf/2018/10/03/college-football-highest-paid-coaches/1497065002/ [https://perma.cc/R65E-SN54]
(listing salaries of college football’s highest paid coaches); see also Abigail Hess, The
10 Highest-Paid NCAA Basketball Coaches, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/03/08/the-10-highest-paid-ncaa-basketball-coaches.html
[https://perma.cc/6PLX-WJAB] (listing salaries of college basketball’s highest
paid coaches).
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While the NCAA and its member universities have prospered,
the organization’s student-athletes have not shared in the riches.11
In recent years, student-athletes have sought financial incentives
from universities as athletic programs have generated massive financial gains.12 Pointing to the required time commitment and
amount of physical labor student-athletes dedicate to athletics over
academics, student-athletes are beginning to consider themselves as
employees of the universities, rather than students of their respective universities.13 Further, for some student-athletes, there is a fear
of suffering a serious injury that could limit, or potentially end, any
hopes of a professional career and the economic security this could
bring.14 Such potential risk was illustrated in February 2019 during
a nationally broadcasted men’s basketball game between the Duke
University Blue Devils and the University of North Carolina Tar
Heels, where Duke forward Zion Williamson’s Nike shoe split open
after he slipped on the basketball court.15 The fallout from this
incident led Nike’s stock to suffer a one percent drop overnight,
equaling approximately one billion dollars, and could have cost
Williamson millions in unrealized economic potential.16 Concerns
such as these have prompted student-athletes, and outside critics, to
call for unionization and fair compensation of student-athletes.17
11. See Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, Fate of the Union: How Northwestern Football
Union Nearly Came to Be, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.si.com/
college-football/2016/02/24/northwestern-union-case-book-indentured [https://
perma.cc/W7LD-VNXF] (finding scholarships for football players who fell short of
living costs by more than $3,000 per year and that “more than 80% of athletes
playing football on ‘full scholarship’ lived below the poverty line”).
12. See id. (noting growing discontent among student-athletes for lack of compensation in exchange for hours devoted to athletic responsibilities, especially in
context of rising revenues of athletic programs).
13. See id. (discussing issues facing student-athletes such as failing to meet
class requirements, difficulty using stipends to cover all off-campus living spending,
and lack of medical care).
14. See id. (describing experience of potential NFL player Cleveland Colter
suffering severe knee injuries during his collegiate career, which he never recovered from, that ruined his NFL dreams).
15. See Mike Murphy, Duke’s Zion Williamson Blows Out His Shoe, Injures Knee,
and Nike Gasps in Horror, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.market
watch.com/story/zion-williamson-blows-out-his-shoe-injures-knee-and-nike-gaspsin-horror-2019-02-20 [https://perma.cc/TR9B-LPXN] (detailing financial fallout
of Zion Williamson’s Nike-made shoe exploded during national televised college
basketball game).
16. See Charlotte Wilder, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy Hopes to End the Madness and
Pay College Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/03/28/senator-chris-murphy-ncaa-college-sports-pay-athletes-madnessinc-report [https://perma.cc/F4TQ-TSSA] (highlighting close association between Nike valuation and student-athletes’ performance).
17. See, e.g., Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015) (discussing
Northwestern University’s scholarship football players’ attempt to unionize under

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

3

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

288

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27: p. 285

The fear among the NCAA and its member universities is that
if student-athletes received a financial incentive for their talents,
that would erode the ideals of amateurism, which represents the
hallmark of collegiate athletics.18 However, the concerns cited by
many critics of the NCAA and its member universities insist that
professionalism is already present in collegiate athletics because the
ideals of amateurism have been removed.19 While the debate on
compensating student-athletes has focused on the protection of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics, the compensation of studentathletes would also put the status of the NCAA and its member universities as tax-exempt organizations, under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”), in jeopardy.20
Section 501(c)(3) provides a tax exemption for corporations
that are “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition.”21 This exemption allows the NCAA
and its member universities to side-step taxes on various activities,
such as revenues derived from radio and broadcasting rights, as well
as corporate sponsorship agreements.22 The NCAA qualifies for
this exemption through its status as the governing body of collegiate athletics whose organizational purpose is to promote amateur athletics.23 Meanwhile, legal precedent has enabled university
athletic programs to operate under the exemption because colthe National Labor Relations Act); see also Marc Edelman, A Prelude to Jenkins v.
NCAA: Amateurism, Antitrust Law, and the Role of Consumer Demand in a Proper Rule of
Reason Analysis, 78 LA. L. REV. 227, 228 (2017) (discussing Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-md-2541 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016), which seeks to
“overturn the NCAA’s amateurism rules that ‘plac[es] a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to [college] athletics for their services.’ ”).
18. See William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism: Saving Intercollegiate Athletics
Through Conference-Athlete Revenue Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551, 554 (2016) (“[P]ayfor-play arrangements would transform the intercollegiate sports model into a minor league in which the virtues of college sports, particularly its connection to
higher education, would disappear.”).
19. See id. at 561 (stating “the reality, though, in revenue sports of men’s football and men’s basketball, is that the entire enterprise has the feel of a professional
economic machines”).
20. See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and Collegiate Athletics, U.
ILL. L. REV. 109, 113 (2010) (describing tax-exempt status universities and NCAA
are characterized under section 503(c)(3) of Code).
21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (stating exemption status of organizations).
22. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, This Is Our House!: – The Tax Man Comes to
College Sports, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2019) (discussing IRS’s attempts to impose taxes on NCAA activities and that of athletic departments of
universities on broadcasting and sponsorship agreements).
23. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 119 (describing NCAA as fostering amateur
athletics, not only including football and basketball but track, gymnastics, and
wresting).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss2/4

4

Kurrass: The Swelling Tide Of Commercialized Amateur Athletics: How Growin

2020] SWELLING TIDE

OF

COMMERCIALIZED AMATEUR ATHLETICS 289

legiate athletics were held to be essential to meeting a university’s
organizational purpose of providing education.24
Compensating student-athletes for their efforts would threaten
the tax-exempt status of the NCAA under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Code, as payment to student-athletes would shift the NCAA’s organizational purpose from managing amateur student-athletes to
managing paid athletes engaging in revenue generating athletic
events.25 Similarly, the tax-exempt status of universities’ athletic
programs under Section 503(c)(3) would also be threatened if student-athletes were to receive compensation.26 At the heart of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics is the idea that students
exchange their efforts on the field for academic benefits off the
field.27 However, the pressure placed on student-athletes to perform in their sport threatens their ability to pursue a degree or gain
a meaningful education.28 By agreeing to compensate student-athletes, universities would distinguish themselves from current legal
precedent, which established that athletics are integral for a university to meet its educational organizational purpose.29 This notion
that athletic programs are integral to a university’s educational purpose would be significantly undermined if student-athletes were
24. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 360 (discussing decisions found in
Kondos v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.W. Va. 1970) and
Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) which both found importance in university sponsored intercollegiate activity for bettering educational
goals of universities).
25. See generally id. (highlighting importance of amateur status of student-athletes to NCAA’s tax-exempt status).
26. See Berry III, supra note 18, at 562–63 (illustrating growing tension between commercial enterprise of intercollegiate athletics and lack of payment to
student-athletes).
27. See id. at 563 (“[T]he idea that student-athletes receive academic benefits
from their respective institutions lies at the heart of the jurisdiction for denying
pay-for-play.”).
28. See id. (“Where athletics require a commitment of forty to sixty hours a
week, engaging in academic matters in a robust way seems like a difficult
proposition.”).
29. See Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)
(“[F]or well over one hundred years athletic programs have been an integral part
of the educational process in colleges and universities throughout the country
. . . .”); see also Kondos v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394, 396
(S.D. W. Va. 1970) (“[Th]e carrying on of an athletic program is an important and
necessary element in the educational process, especially at institutions of higher
learning.”); Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) (“For
college students, athletics offers an opportunity to exacuate leadership skills, learn
teamwork, build self-confidence, and perfect self-discipline. In addition, for many
student-athletes, physical skills are a passport to college admissions and scholarships, allowing them to attend otherwise inaccessible schools. These opportunities, and the lessons learned on the playing fields, are invaluable in attaining
career and life successes in and out of professional sports.”).
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compensated as student-athletes would no longer be competing in
their respective sports for academic benefit, but economic gain.30
The tax-exempt status for both the NCAA and its member universities has been in dispute due to the growing commercialization
of intercollegiate athletics, the relationship between the organizations’ tax-exempt status, and the lack of compensation for the student-athletes’ labor.31 Various theories have been proposed to
bring a sense of equality to the relationship between the tax-exempt
organizations of the NCAA and its member universities, with student-athletes seeking compensation for their time and labor.32
However, each of these theories fall short of providing a beneficial
outcome to not only the NCAA and its member universities but the
student-athletes seeking fair compensation.33
This Comment discusses the various strategies that have been
proposed to resolve the disparity between the Section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status of the NCAA and its member universities, as well
as the flaws of each of these proposals.34 In order to protect the
positive benefits of the NCAA and its member universities’ tax-exempt status, while equalizing the financial playing field for studentathletes, Congress should pass the Student-Athlete Equity Act.35
30. See Berry III, supra note 18, at 562–63 (discussing efforts of student-athletes in commitment to amateur collegiate athletics, raising doubts on academic
benefits student-athletes receive).
31. See generally Erik M. Jansen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35 (1987) (discussing rationale on
allowing tax emptions to universities instead of paying student-athletes).
32. See generally Marc Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee-Athletes: Why a
“Pay For Play” Model of College Sports Would Not Necessarily Make Educational Scholarships Taxable, 58 B.C.L. REV. 1137 (2017) (discussing ramifications of “pay for play”
model on universities and the NCAA); see also Colombo, supra note 20 (discussing
implications of completely removing tax emption from NCAA and utilizing tax
exemption as structuring incentives for universities).
33. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 144 (describing issues taxing revenue generated from NCAA and its members universities); see also Marcia Chambers, COLLEGES; Brand Endorses More Aid to Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2003), https://
www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/sports/colleges-brand-endorses-more-aid-to-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/TTU7-4V2J?type=image] (determining certain student-athlete benefits would pale in comparison to revenue generated by NCAA
and its members universities).
34. For a further discussion of the various theories to resolve the inequal disparity between Section 501(c)(3) exempted organizations of the NCAA and its
member universities with the lack of compensation of student-athletes, see infra
notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
35. See generally Kyle Jahner, NCAA Tax Status Tied to Athletes’ Image Rights Under
New Bill, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 14, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/ip-law/ncaa-tax-status-tied-to-athletes-image-rights-under-new-bill [https://
perma.cc/Q47E-9KH9] (reporting on new bill proposed in Congress called “The
Student-Athlete Equity Act”).
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This legislation, currently in the House of Representative’s Ways
and Means Committee, would preserve the tax-exempt status of the
NCAA and its member universities on the contingency of allowing
student-athletes to seek opportunities to receive compensation for
their name, image, and likeness.36 The Student-Athlete Equity Act
would be a compromise for the NCAA, by allowing the organization
to maintain its tax-exempt status, in exchange for permitting student-athletes to seek and receive compensation off the playing
field.37
Section II of this Comment provides the historical context surrounding the growth of intercollegiate athletics from the beginning
stages of “amateurism” to the modern landscape of intercollegiate
athletics.38 Section II also discusses how Section 501(c)(3) of the
Code came to be applied to universities and the NCAA, as well as an
overview of how organizations become tax-exempt under Section
501(c)(3).39 Section III of this Comment discusses the various proposed strategies to resolve the disparity between the 501(c)(3) taxexempt status of the NCAA and its member universities with the
lack of compensation for student-athletes.40 Section III not only
concludes that these theories fail to adequately resolve the inequitable disparity, but also provides an argument for altering the Code
through passage of the Student-Athlete Equity Act as the best solution to resolve this inequality.41 Ultimately, this Comment argues
in favor of the passage of the Student-Equity Act as the most effective means to close the gap between the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt revenue and non-compensation of student-athletes.42

36. See id. (discussing Equity Act’s effects if passed by Congress).
37. See id. (finding alteration of 501(c)(3) would allow flexibility in implementing changes in order for NCAA to become complaint with alteration of tax
code).
38. For further discussion of the beginning stages of amateurism and intercollegiate athletics, see infra notes 50–71 and accompanying text.
39. For further discussion of the legal history of Section 501(c)(3) and its
application to the NCAA and its member universities, see infra notes 115–180 and
accompanying text.
40. For further discussion of proposed theories to resolve disparity between
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations and uncompensated student-athletes, see infra
notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
41. For further discussion of fallacies of proposed theories, see infra notes
220–253 and accompanying text.
42. For further discussion of arguments in favor of Student-Athlete Equity
Act, see infra notes 254–278 and accompany text.
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II. HOW AMATEURISM LED TO A TAX EXEMPTION, REVENUES,
UNDER-COMPENSATED STUDENT-ATHLETES

AND

The NCAA and its member universities’ athletic programs have
experienced large and increasing revenue streams through the contributions of uncompensated student-athletes.43 These revenue
streams have been largely untaxed, as both the NCAA and universities’ athletic programs are tax-exempt organizations under Section
501(c)(3) of the Code.44 As revenue has grown, various strategies
have emerged to resolve the disparity between the tax-free nature
of the revenue with the lack of compensation for the student-athletes who help generate these revenue streams.45
To understand how the NCAA and its member universities’
athletic programs became capable of generating revenues equating
to just above one billion dollars, it is important to first understand
the historical context of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics and
how the modern landscape came to be.46 Further, a background of
the legal history and precedent which allowed the NCAA and its
member universities to benefit from tax-exempt status under
501(c)(3) of the Code will be analyzed.47 Finally, a deeper insight
into how 501(c)(3) of the Code applies to organizations potentially
seeking tax-exempt status will be examined to demonstrate the
mechanics behind 501(c)(3)’s application to the NCAA and its
members universities.48 Once this historical background and overview of 501(c)(3) has been discussed, proposed strategies will be
introduced which seek to repair the inequitable disparity between
the NCAA and its members universities’ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt reve43. See Bloomberg, supra note 1 (describing revenue generated by NCAA
through events featuring non-compensated student-athletes, including March
Madness and college football broadcasts).
44. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 115–16 (stating eligibility of NCAA and its
member universities as 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations).
45. See id. (detailing strategy which targets specific taxation on revenue from
non-tax-exempt activities of NCAA and its member universities). For further discussion of other strategies to combat the disparity between tax-exemption of the
NCAA and its member universities and the lack of compensation of student-athletes, see infra notes 172–209 and accompanying text.
46. For further discussion of the history of amateurism and intercollegiate
athletic competition in the United States, see infra notes 50–102 and accompanying text.
47. For further discussion of the legal history of Section 501(c)(3) and its
extension to the NCAA and universities athletic programs, see infra notes 103–143
and accompany text.
48. For further discussion of how organizations become tax-exempt under
Section 501(c)(3), see infra notes 144–180 and accompanying text.
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nues and the lack of compensation for the labor and efforts of student-athletes in revenue-generating athletics events.49
A. How It All Started: The History of Amateurism in
University Athletic Programs
1. Growth of Intercollegiate Athletics: Amateurism or Professionalism?
The idea of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics can be
traced back to athletic competitions between British universities as
early as the beginning of the 1800s.50 British amateurism was characterized by deep social class divisions, with upper class gentlemen
competing amongst one another for the sake of competition, while
working class individuals played for compensation.51 At the inception of amateur sports within American universities, social class divisions were not as prevalent, as university members of all social
classes competed athletically against other university members,
spurred on by financial incentives for their respective colleges.52
However, during the 1920s, growing concerns about the violent nature of intercollegiate competitions, particularly in intercollegiate
football, led to President Theodore Roosevelt calling for the formation of a governing body for intercollegiate athletics.53 The early
adoption of the NCAA sought to rectify many of the safety concerns
present at the time, and resulted in standardizing the ideals of amateurism among the NCAA member universities.54
49. For further discussion introducing the various strategies to combat the
disparity between tax-exempt status of the NCAA and its member universities and
the lack of compensation for student-athletes, see infra notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
50. See Matthew J. Mitten, et al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate
Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 786–87 (2010) (discussing elite British universities holding principles of amateurism in high regard as competing solely for competition is seen as gentlemanly).
51. See Berry III, supra note 18, at 557–58 (describing divide in social classes
between those athletes competing for compensation and those competing for “the
love of the game”).
52. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 786–87 (highlighting financial incentives that appeared in intercollegiate competition in American universities, such as
Harvard rowing team being awarded financially for success).
53. See W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1932, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. REV. 211,
215–16 (2006) (describing response of President Theodore Roosevelt to assemble
athletic directors from major universities to address concerns of violence in intercollegiate competition, in particular, circumstances which led to death for eighteen young men while competing in intercollegiate football).
54. See id. at 222–23 (defining NCAA’s first constitution, which strove to maintain amateurism in intercollegiate competition, through clauses such as, “no student shall represent a College or university in any intercollegiate game or contest

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

9

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

294

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27: p. 285

Throughout the 1900s, the growth and popularity of intercollegiate sports led universities to recognize their athletic programs as
part of their physical education departments, which allowed universities to have control over the athletic programs and allowed for
financial support from the universities’ alumni base.55 This financial support was important for dealing with expenses associated
with the growing athletic enterprises, namely larger stadiums and
the hiring of full-time head coaches.56 These expenses were followed with explosive revenues, as the popularity of collegiate athletics skyrocketed with the introduction of the first nationally televised
intercollegiate football game.57
At first, the NCAA controlled and limited television broadcast
options.58 However, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
1983 that the controlled broadcast of intercollegiate athletics by the
NCAA violated antitrust laws.59 This opened the opportunity for
television broadcast giants, such as CBS and NBC, to enter into the
lucrative world of televised intercollegiate athletics.60 Television
broadcast giants have recently encountered new competition, as
athletic conferences and individual universities have started to form
their own televisions networks, such as the University of Texas’s
Longhorn Network.61
who has at any time received whether directly or indirectly, money or other
consideration”).
55. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 789 (observing growth of intercollegiate
athletics and ramifications of this growth in relation to influxes of alumni financial
support).
56. See Carter, supra note 53, at 236 (describing various infrastructure constructions to athletic programs of various universities, such as Ohio State University’s 64,000-seat stadium, Brown University’s $750,000 gymnasium, and new
stadiums for Vanderbilt University, University of Michigan, and University of
Wisconsin).
57. See Christine Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O’Bannon v. NCAA
On Appeal and the Future of Intercollegiate Athletics, 93 N.C.L. REV. 90, 93–94 (2015)
(describing first televised intercollegiate football contest and growth in popularity
of intercollegiate athletics with popularization of television aiding growth).
58. See id. at 94 (describing extent of control NCAA had over television broadcasts of intercollegiate athletics).
59. See id. (noting Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma which removed control of NCAA over broadcasts of intercollegiate football, due to violations of federal antitrust laws).
60. See id. (stating extent of level of involvement of television broadcast companies into intercollegiate sports after Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Board
of Regent of University of Oklahoma).
61. See id. at 94–95 (noting various universities entering broadcast market,
including University of Texas’s $300 million agreement for ESPN’s Longhorn Network); see also Karen Weaver, The Big Ten Network Was Created By and For Its Fans –
And Turned A Profit In Less Than Two Years, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/karenweaver/2020/01/04/the-big-ten-network-was-created-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss2/4

10

Kurrass: The Swelling Tide Of Commercialized Amateur Athletics: How Growin

2020] SWELLING TIDE

OF

COMMERCIALIZED AMATEUR ATHLETICS 295

With growing revenues from the college football playoffs and
the March Madness basketball tournament, the modern landscape
of intercollegiate sports has evolved from an amateur competition
between two universities to that of a big business.62 This evolution
has produced similarities between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports leagues, such as the emphasis on corporate sponsorships and collection of large profits from the efforts of the
athletes.63 Two other aspects which reflect this change away from
amateurism to a business model can be seen in the expenses of the
universities’ athletic departments and the revenue stream of the
governing body, the NCAA.64 Construction of athletic facilities,
such as Clemson University’s fifty-five million dollar football complex, highlight the growing expenditures of large athletic programs. 65 Further, the NCAA, through various contractual
agreements from television and marketing deals, have generated
just over one billion dollars in revenue as a not-for-profit organization.66 The revenues and expenditures evoke criticism of the nonby-and-for-its-fans—-and-turned-a-profit-in-less-than-two-years/#2d8375407212
[https://perma.cc/26SZ-EQ6G] (highlighting $759 million in revenue generated
from Big Ten Conference’s network in 2018); Kevin Draper, New Cable Network For
A.C.C. Heightens Arms Race in College Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/sports/ncaafootball/acc-network-espn.html
[https://perma.cc/79FD-XBWF?type=image] (noting expansion of ACC Conference into media agreements with decision to create ACC Network with ESPN).
62. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 351 (discussing current landscape of
intercollegiate athletic); see also Brent Schrotenboer, College Football Playoff Business
is Booming at Halfway Point, But Expansion Looms, USA Today (Jan. 9, 2020, 9:55
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2020/01/09/college-football-playoff-financial-success-expansion-future/2838495001/ [https://perma.cc/
LBB5-5T3B] (describing $549 million paid out to conference and universities from
New Year’s Six bowl games compromising college football’s playoff rotation); Mike
Ozanian, March Madness is Most Profitable Postseason TV Deal In Sports, Forbes (Mar.
19, 2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2019/03/19/
march-madness-is-most-profitable-postseason-tv-deal-in-sports/#5c289ada1795
[https://perma.cc/9Z3T-DMJP] (stating ad revenue generated from March Madness equaling $1.285 billon in 2017 and $1.32 billion in 2018).
63. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 351 (stating collegiate athletics departments have raised over one billion dollars in donations, along with vast
amounts of revenue from ticket sales, branding, television, radio, and internet
broadcasting rights).
64. See id. at 351–52 (describing expenses accumulated by university’s athletic
programs and profitability of NCAA, considered predominately not-for-profit
organization).
65. See id. at 352 (highlighting Clemson University, after being named
2016–2017 College Football champion, approval to construct new football
complex).
66. See id. at 352–53 (stating revenue generated by NCAA is over one billion
dollars, generated through television and market rights contractual agreements
highlighted by $857 million earned from Turner Broadcasting to air annually
NCAA’s March Madness basketball tournament in 2018).
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profit status of these organizations have maintained through their
organizational purpose of promoting amateurism.67
Growing revenue streams and expenditures of intercollegiate
athletics have led to criticism of the management of intercollegiate
athletics, accusing the NCAA and its members universities of shying
away from prioritizing academics and focusing primarily on the revenue-generating athletics.68 This has called into question not only
the tax-exempt status of the NCAA and its members universities,
but the non-compensated efforts of student-athletes.69 As the emphasis on student-athletes increasingly focuses on athletics instead
of academics, many critics question whether student-athletes should
no longer be treated solely as students, but employees of the university.70 If amateurism is eroded away in intercollegiate athletics, this
could lead to large-scale ramifications of the favorable tax treatment that the NCAA and its member universities enjoy.71
2. NCAA’s Preservation of “Amateurism” in the Face of Growing
Professionalization of Intercollegiate Athletics
The modern definition of amateurism adopted by the NCAA is
codified in Section 2.9 of the NCAA Manual.72 Under Section 2.9,
“[s]tudent-[a]thletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated primarily by education
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived . . .
[s]tudent participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation,
and student-athletes should be protecting from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”73 Per NCAA rules, activities
such as professional contracts, receiving financial gain from compe67. See Ronald Katz, Ending the NCAA’s Tax Exemption Should Be A Slam Dunk,
THE NATION (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/marchmadness-tax-exemption-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/KUJ2-RUAJ?type=image]
(describing criticisms against NCAA for tax-exempt status in face of growing revenues in intercollegiate athletics).
68. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22 (stating escalating salaries of college
coaches have reflected prioritization of college athletics for winning and generating revenue through athletic programs rather than focusing on academics).
69. See id. (finding existence of criticism to continued legitimacy of maintaining college sports ideal of amateurism).
70. See id. (stating disconnect between student-athletes being “workhorses of
successful athletic programs” and commercialization of college athletics).
71. See id. at 354–55 (finding continued existence of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics primarily for tax benefits garnered by NCAA and its member
universities).
72. See Berry III, supra note 18, at 559 (determining NCAA holds education as
cornerstone of its existence).
73. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2019–2020 Division I Manual, Section 2.09,
PRINCIPLES OF AMATEURISM (2019), available at https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/re
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titions, and agent agreements for representation are all deemed as
violations of the amateur classification.74 However, if the financial
benefit is tied to education, this is deemed an acceptable form of
compensation by the NCAA, including scholarships for tuition and
cost of attendance for the respective university.75
Further, the NCAA allows member universities to utilize the
name, image, and likeness of student-athletes for institutional, charitable, educational, or nonprofit promotions.76 The use of a student-athletes image and likeness is not just limited to a university’s
promotional materials, but can be sold through commercial outlets,
such as the university’s athletic stores, as well as through the
NCAA’s own commercial outlets and relationships.77 While the
NCAA and the member universities are allowed to sell the name,
image, and likeness of the student-athletes in organizational related commercial outlets, student-athletes do not receive this same
unrestricted ability.78
In April 2020, the NCAA reversed their long-standing position
of refusing to consider the payment of student-athletes, with the
NCAA’s Board of Governors supporting modifications to the rules
disallowing third-party compensation to student-athletes beginning
in the 2021–22 academic year.79 These modifications would allow
student-athletes to appear in advertisements and reference their
ports/getReport/90008 [https://perma.cc/5MEY-W2QJ] (noting student-athletes
are to be aware of being exploited “by professional and commercial enterprises”).
74. See Berry III, supra note 18, at 560 (listing certain activities which NCAA
has determined to be in violation of amateurism).
75. See id. (“[F]unds provided in support of education, including scholarships, room, board, and most recently, cost of attendance, all fall within the concept of amateurism because they are expenditures related to education.”).
76. See NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. 12, § 5, cl. 1 (effective
Aug. 1, 2019) (stating NCAA member institutions may “use a student-athlete’s
name, picture or appearance to support its charitable or educational activities or
to support activities considered incidental to the student-athlete’s participating in
intercollegiate athletics”).
77. See NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. 12, §5, cl. 1.1 (effective
Aug. 1, 2019) (codifying rules which allows universities and NCAA to use name,
image, and likeness of student-athletes to promote activities such as charity events
or NCAA events).
78. See generally NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. 12, §5, cl. 2 (effective Aug. 1, 2019) (regulating non-permissible actions that student-athletes cannot take in order to maintain eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics).
79. See Michael McCann, Legal Challenges Await After NCAA Shifts on Athletes’
Name, Image and Likeness Rights, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.si.com/college/2020/04/29/ncaa-name-image-likeness-changes-legal-analysis
[https://perma.cc/CQG9-XFJ2] (noting changes agreed to by NCAA Board of
Governor for upcoming 2021-22 academic year).
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schools.80 However, details about the regulations placed on these
endorsement opportunities are still undecided and the expectations are the changes will restrict access to these opportunities.81
The NCAA stated the regulations will seek ways to curb the influence of certain individuals and boosters attempting to tie endorsement money to athletic performance, as well as seek out federal
help to impose caps on the value and types of endorsement deals
student-athletes may seek.82 While these upcoming changes are a
large step in the right direction, they fail to adequately protect student-athletes’ interests.83 The NCAA would reserve the ability to
determine which endorsements are consistent with NCAA’s membership values, which is a vague standard, and the NCAA would be
able to restrict certain companies from being able to offer endorsement opportunities, such as companies that have been involved in
prior recruiting violations.84 Further, the NCAA would not allow
student-athletes to be compensated for “live broadcasts, rebroadcasts, news accounts or many informational items or pictures” as the
NCAA has determined these outlets constitute “pay-for-play.”85
Rather than offering a free marketplace for student-athletes to seek
out the best opportunities, the NCAA would only offer to studentathletes a limited, controlled marketplace favorable to the NCAA
and “ideals of amateurism.”86
80. See Dan Murphy, NCAA Group Supports Player Endorsement Plan, ESPN (Apr.
29, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29112263/ncaagroup-oks-conditional-player-endorsements [https://perma.cc/4D78-ZMA3]
(highlighting changes approved by NCAA Board of Governors).
81. See McCann, supra note 79 (remarking any future changes to allow student-athletes to seek endorsement opportunities will most likely be restricted
which rather than create free market opportunities for student-athletes, would create only limited opportunities).
82. See Murphy, supra note 80 (noting certain restrictions which NCAA Board
of Governors would seek to install in finalized rules for student-athletes seeking
third-party endorsement opportunities).
83. See McCann, supra note 79 (detailing recommendations of NCAA Board
of Governors which would dictate that universities and athletic conferences restrict
the “autonomy of athletes” by disallowing certain value and type of endorsement
opportunities).
84. See id. (outlining one NCAA “guidance principle” to ensure “clear distinction” between amateur and professional athletics which would be imposed when
rules allowed student-athletes to seek third-party endorsement opportunities are
established).
85. See id. (describing “guardrails” to ensure that pay-for-play is not disguised
as payments for student-athletes name, image, or likeness).
86. See Murphy, supra note 80 (noting NCAA’s recommended policy is more
restrictive than any current state laws or proposed state laws, which could not be
most appropriate solution compared to unrestricted free market).
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The NCAA has sought to promote amateurism in intercollegiate athletics for the protection of student-athletes against the
outside pressures and influences of commercialization.87 However,
student-athletes have become increasingly critical of how much emphasis is placed on their education in relation to their role as athletes.88 This criticism has generated a variety of legal claims by
student-athletes against universities for violating the understanding
that student-athletes would forfeit their time and efforts to athletics
in exchange for a quality education.89 One example of this failure
is a claim brought by a former basketball player for Creighton University, who was found to possess educational skills below a high
school level after his graduation from Creighton.90 Another example was brought by a Clemson University student-athlete who was
provided poor academic advice which resulted in the student-athlete’s inability to meet the NCAA’s academic requirements for
participation.91
The most recent example demonstrating the shortfall of the
NCAA members universities in providing educational benefits to
student-athletes are the allegations against the University of North
Carolina.92 The University of North Carolina offered a class in the
African and Afro-American Studies Department where half of the
87. See Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQUETTE
SPORT L. REV. 287, 288 (2016) (discussing fundamental policy of NCAA is to protect amateur status of student-athletes in order bolster academics and student-athlete experiences).
88. See id. (discussing failure of universities to provide adequate educational
benefit in exchange for student-athletes’ labor and time in generating revenues
through various athletic events which student-athletes participate in).
89. See id. at 288–90 (highlighting various legal claims by student-athletes
against universities for failure to provide adequate education, with each claim being rejected by courts due to court’s determination that student-athletes do not
have right to play intercollegiate sports, as it is just privilege).
90. See id. at 288–89 (providing example of legal claims brought by Creighton
University former basketball player for failure of Creighton University to provide
adequate education during student-athlete’s playing days).
91. See id. at 289 (providing an example of legal claims for failure to provide
adequate education of Clemson University student-athlete who was given false academic advice by Clemson University which caused the student-athlete to fail to
meet NCAA’s educational standards for participation).
92. See generally B. David Ridpath, North Carolina Releases NCAA’s Third, Yes
Third, Notice of Allegations in Academic Fraud Case, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:18 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bdavidridpath/2016/12/22/north-carolina-releases-ncaas-third-yes-third-notice-of-allegations-in-academic-fraud-case/
#72dff6392d24 [https://perma.cc/N59E-LNHM] (reporting on false academic
classes provided through University of North Carolina to student-athletes).
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students enrolled were student-athletes.93 There was no required
class meeting time and no instructor was assigned to the class.94 In
order to get a passing grade in the class, the students had to submit
one paper, which, no matter the quality of the paper, would produce a passing grade.95 This course allowed the student-athletes at
the University of North Carolina to maintain their athletic eligibility
under the NCAA’s academic requirements but failed to provide any
educational value to the student-athletes.96
The NCAA maintains that the purpose of their organization is
to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the education program . . . by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”97 However, the emphasis on the educational value of the amateur studentathlete has been curtailed by the pressure on student-athletes from
the NCAA and its member universities to focus primarily on athletics in order to benefit the organization’s commercial gains.98 As
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics has been supplanted by commercialization, efforts must be taken to bridge the disconnect between the promotion of a tax-exempt billion dollar enterprise and
the protection of student-athletes.99
B. The Birth of the Hidden Tax-Haven: The History of How the
NCAA and University Athletic Programs
Became Tax-Exempt
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code allows corporations and institutions to gain tax-exempt status as long as the corporation or institution is organized and operates for one of the specific reasons in the
93. See id. (stating class topic which was under investigation for academic
fraud at University of North Carolina).
94. See id. (detailing characteristics of University of North Carolina class which
student-athletes registered for).
95. See id. (detailing general requirements of students of University of North
Carolina’s class to achieve passing grades).
96. See id. (stating conclusion of NCAA’s investigation, which determined reasoning for the University of North Carolina to offer this class).
97. NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1 (effective Aug. 1,
2019) (stating NCAA’s organizational purpose and policy).
98. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 837 (detailing aspects of “subordination
of higher education academic values to the forces of commercialization, and the
student-athletes’ inability to realize the educational benefits of the bargain for providing playing services” has created problems for student-athletes for which solutions must be found).
99. For further discussion of different solutions to combat commercialization
of intercollegiate athletics, see infra notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
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Code.100 Universities have historically met the tax-exempt status because they were created for the purpose of providing educational
benefit to the public.101 Under Section 501(c)(3), being organized
and operated for the exclusive purpose of education grants universities this tax benefit.102 However, this tax exemption did not extend to a university’s athletic programs, nor the NCAA, until the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.103
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 altered Section 501(c)(3) of the
Code by adding a new tax exemption to organizations and institutions whose purpose is “to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve[s] the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment).”104 This language
does not entitle any organization which participates in efforts of
athletic activities to be eligible for tax exemption.105 Instead, an
organization which participates in organizing amateur sports competition can qualify for the 501(c)(3) exception under three different rationales.106 First, if the organization provides a youth athletic
league or organizes youth athletics, or the organization is affiliated
with an exempted educational organization, the organization may
qualify for the 501(c)(3) tax exemption, and is allowed to provide
facilities and equipment.107 Second, if the organization “develops,
promotes, and regulates a sport for youths” with the goal of shifting
the responsibility to organize charitable activities to curb juvenile
delinquency away from local governments, it may qualify for the
501(c)(3) exemption.108 Third, an organization can meet the
100. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (codifying reasons organization
must have in order to be considered for tax-exempt status).
101. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 359 (detailing universities have historically met requirements of tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3)).
102. See id. (stating universities meet tax-exempt purpose of education under
Section 501(c)(3)).
103. See Tax-Exempt Status of Amateur Sports Organizations, 40 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1705, 1714 (1983) (stating organizations which supported amateur athletics
were not tax-exempt until Tax Reform Act of 1976 was passed).
104. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 1313, I.R.C. § 501 (1976) (creating tax-exempt
reason for organizations which foster amateur athletics).
105. See I.R.S. I.R.M. 7.25.26.2 (March 8, 1999) (concluding sports activity
alone is not by itself enough to warrant tax exemption under 501(c)(3)).
106. See id. (interpreting three rationales whereby organizations participating
in sports competition can claim tax-exemption under 501(c)(3)).
107. See I.R.S. I.R.M. 7.25.26.2(1)(a) (March 8, 1999) (determining 501(c)(3)
tax-exemption extends to organizations either teaching youths sports or is affiliated with organizations that are already exempted).
108. See I.R.S. I.R.M. 7.25.26.2(1)(b) (March 8, 1999) (extending 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status to organizations created for charitable purposes which provide
athletic programs, such as organizations which organize athletics programs to combat juvenile delinquency or lessen social burdens of government).
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501(c)(3) tax exemption if it is organized and operated to “foster
national or international amateur sports competition and no part
of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment.”109
To conceptualize the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the language of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, a variety
of legal precedent was decided to assist with the interpretation of
the new language, as well as extend its applicability to the NCAA.110
For universities’ athletic programs, the language of Section
501(c)(3) extended to their activities through a precedential determination that athletics programs are a vital part of the educational
experience which universities provide.111
1. History of Tax Exemption of Section 501(c)(3) for Universities
A university’s athletic program qualifies for Section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status through the athletic program’s affiliation with an
already tax-exempt organization—the educational arm of the university.112 Further, the IRS has interpreted that university athletic
programs serve a complimentary role to the clear Section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt educational purpose of the university.113 Activities such
as bettering the physical development of student-athletes and providing necessary services to both student-athletes and coaches, allows an athletic program to be considered an “integral part of [a
university’s] overall educational activities.”114 The IRS has further
determined that the commercial aspects of contractual broadcast
rights and the revenue earned through intercollegiate competition
are related to the Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempted educational pur109. I.R.S. I.R.M. 7.25.26.2(1)(c) (March 8, 1999) (granting 501(c)(3) taxexempt status to organizations which foster national or international amateur athletic competition so long as no facilities or equipment are provided).
110. See Rev. Rule. 67–291, 1967–2 C.B. 184 (concluding universities’ athletic
programs engage in activities which make athletic programs vital parts of universities’ tax-exempted educational purpose).
111. See Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding universities affiliated athletic programs provide are integral to universities’ tax-exempted educational purposes).
112. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 360 (determining athletic programs
of universities are affiliated with Section 501(c)(3)’s educational exempted purpose of universities).
113. See id. (discussing two IRS rulings which found universities’ athletic programs are tax-exempt due to beneficial relationship between athletic programs
and tax–exempt universities).
114. Rev. Rule. 67–291, 1967–2 C.B. 184 (concluding universities’ athletic
programs engage in activities which makes athletic programs vital to universities’
tax-exempted educational purpose).
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pose of the university.115 The rationale for the IRS’s decision was
reached by determining that since athletic events are related to the
operation of athletic programs, and athletic programs are related to
the educational purpose of universities, the income derived from
athletic events can be linked to the Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempted
educational purpose of universities.116 Therefore, revenue collected through intercollegiate athletic competition and broadcast
rights is given tax-exempt treatment under Section 501(c)(3).117
The IRS’s determination of the relationship between university
athletic programs and the tax-exempt educational purpose of universities has been supported by legal precedent.118 In 1986, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that athletic programs are a significant aspect of the educational experience of universities
through the programs’ emphasis on teamwork and sportsmanship
placed on the student-athletes.119 The Court found this true, “notwithstanding the fact that in recent years big-time college athletics
have at time[s] taken on a tinge of commercialism.”120 This emphasis on the importance that athletic programs have on the taxexempted educational purpose of universities was reinforced in a
1993 decision in the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals.121
In that instance, the court found athletic programs are important
towards the educational purpose of their affiliated universities because they offer an avenue to college admissions for those individuals who otherwise could not attend these universities.122 This
115. See Rev. Rul. 80–296, 1980–2 C.B. 195 (concluding broadcast rights and
revenues from intercollegiate athletic competitions are considered related to taxexempted educational purposes of universities and therefore, these revenues are
tax-exempt under 501(c)(3)).
116. See id. (stating IRS’s interpretation of why revenue from broadcast rights
from intercollegiate athletic events should be considered tax-exempt).
117. See id. (holding athletic events are related to universities’ tax-exempted
educational purpose under Section 501(c)(3)).
118. For further discussion of relevant case law which supports IRS rulings
that universities’ athletic programs are related to universities’ tax-exempted purpose and as such, tax-exempt under 501(c)(3), see infra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
119. See Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding athletic programs provide integral aspect to universities’ tax-exempted educational purposes).
120. Id. (contrasting current wave of commercialization seen in college athletics with facts of athletic programs providing educational benefit to their affiliated
universities remains true).
121. See generally Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding importance athletic programs affiliated with educational institutions have towards tax-exempted educational purposes of universities).
122. See id. at 891 (stating vital role which athletic programs affiliated with
universities provide to better tax-exempted educational purposes of universities).
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decision highlighted the importance of athletic programs in opening doors for student-athletes to have the opportunity to pursuing a
career and financial success through educational opportunities provided by these universities.123
2. Legal History of Tax Exemption of 501(c)(3) for NCAA
Under the NCAA’s Constitution, the organization’s basic purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body and . . . retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”124 Under this expression of purpose, the NCAA can maintain its tax-exempt status
for fostering amateur sports competition.125 However, questions
have arisen regarding whether the NCAA is no longer solely focused on fostering amateur athletic competition.126 If it is determined that the NCAA is not operating solely for their intended
purpose, the organization could be disqualified from its current
tax-exempt status.127
The NCAA has defended its Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status against criticism from both Congress and the Supreme Court.128
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,129 the
United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
123. See id. (describing importance of opportunity to attend university
through participation in affiliated athletic programs provides for betterment of
universities’ tax-exempted educational purpose).
124. NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1 (effective Aug.
1, 2019) (codifying NCAA’s basic purpose through NCAA’s mission statement).
125. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (expressing exempt purposes of organizations which foster national or international amateur sports competition as granting
organizations tax-exempt status).
126. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 365 (stating criticisms of whether
NCAA continues to operate solely for its expressed reason to foster amateur athletic competition as NCAA has engaged in billion-dollar contractual agreements
and sought to install politically correct standards of tolerance on its member
universities).
127. See id. (stating criticism of NCAA for not being classified under for-profit
organizations and as such, should be disqualified from tax-exempt status of
501(c)(3)).
128. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984) (detailing NCAA’s argument for continuing to enjoy tax-exempt
status under Section 501(c)(3)); see also Elia Powers, The NCAA Responds, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/16/
ncaa-responds [https://perma.cc/HW6F-94AE] (detailing arguments provided to
members of Congress about NCAA’s continued treatment as tax-exempt under
Section 501(c)(3)). For further discussion of the criticism of NCAA’s tax-exempt
status and NCAA’s response in defense of continuing to maintain its tax-exempt
status under 501(c)(3), see infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
129. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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the NCAA could dictate the television rights of its member universities.130 The Court determined during the case that “the economic
significance of the NCAA’s nonprofit character is questionable at
best.”131 The NCAA previously defended its position as a Section
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.132 There, the NCAA
attempted to protect their ability to control the television rights of
the University of Oklahoma.133 The District Court commented that
the focus of the NCAA may have shifted away from the promotion
of amateurism towards a business seeking the maximization of revenue.134 However, while the District Court, and later on the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and eventually the Supreme Court, determined the NCAA violated antitrust laws by restricting access to college football television rights, the District Court refused to redefine
the purpose of the NCAA.135
In more recent years, Congress has revisited the discussion of
whether the NCAA should maintain its tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) by demanding the NCAA justify its position as a nonprofit organization.136 In responding to Congress, the NCAA’s attempt to justify its Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status was met with
criticisms, especially towards some of the parallels the NCAA drew
130. See generally id. (providing background of legal dispute for Supreme
Court).
131. Id. at 100 n.22 (noting likelihood that NCAA’s focus has shifted from
fostering amateur athletic competition to become more business-oriented focus of
maximizing revenue).
132. See Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (documenting instances whereby NCAA appeared in front of District Court to argue
ability to control television agreements of intercollegiate athletics).
133. See id. at 1286 (stating circumstances for which matter was brought to
court, where universities and their respective athletic conferences challenged
NCAA’s ability to control ability to negotiate all intercollegiate athletic television
agreements).
134. See id. at 1288–89 (concluding NCAA and its associate member universities are seeking revenue maximization similar to any business).
135. See id. at 1329 (“NCAA has strayed far from the purposes for which it was
organized. The Court does not know and need not determine whether the NCAA
administration, in formulating the controls at issue, was motivated by genuine concern for NCAA members, by a lust for power, or by rank greed. What is clear is
that NCAA has violated the antitrust laws, and that the Court’s duty is to restore
competition to this monopolized industry.”).
136. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, The Claim Game: Analyzing
the Tax Implications of Student-Athlete Insurance Policy Payouts, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 231, 256 (2018) (detailing actions undertaken by Congress in 2006 to
demand NCAA to justify reasons they should continue to maintain their 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status provided for non-profit organizations).
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to defend its status as a non-profit organization.137 In particular,
critics flagged the parallel that the NCAA’s efforts of organizing
and sponsoring athletic programs for student-athletes provide benefits similar to theatrical or musical performances provide for actors
and musicians, teaching educational lessons in a practical manner.138 While the NCAA defended itself by continuing to take the
stance that it is akin to higher education by providing similar educational opportunities, the NCAA did not irrefutably disarm criticisms
against their activities enjoying Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.139 These criticism leaves open the possibility of future challenges arising as public opinion aligns with the call of studentathletes to receive equitable compensation for their efforts in the
NCAA’s billion dollar enterprise.140
C. Qualifications and Requirements of 501(c)(3) Organizations
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code grants tax-exempt status for
“corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable . . . or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . .”141 Within Section
501(c)(3), two tests exist that must be independently satisfied in
order for an organization to be considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3), the “organizational test” and the “operational
test.”142
1. The Organizational Test
Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, two requirements are
necessary for an organization to meet the organizational test under
137. See Powers, supra note 128 (detailing contents of written correspondence
between NCAA and Congress which sought to justify NCAA’s continuation of being classified as non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3)).
138. See id. (quoting NCAA’s justification letter to Congress which stated,
“athletic contests are the laboratory for lessons taught in practice in the same way
theatrical or musical performances provide practical application of the lessons
taught in rehearsals”).
139. See id. (stating NCAA’s justification for its tax-exempt status is that it “operates in the same sphere as the rest of higher education”).
140. See id. (characterizing NCAA’s justification letter as being defensive and
not in line with various “empirical research and facts”).
141. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (codifying tax-exempt status of certain
organizations).
142. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 805 (describing two tests which organizations must meet independently in order to be considered for tax-exemption status under Section 501(c)(3)).
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Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.143 First, the organization must be
created for a limited purpose which meets one of the exempted
purposes as defined and listed in Section 501(c)(3).144 Second, the
organization must not itself participate, or allow participation, in
activities which do not further one or more of the exempted purposes listed in 501(c)(3) of the Code.145
Educational organizations are required to meet both requirements of the organizational test to qualify for tax-exempt status
under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.146 The definition of “educational” in the context of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, encompasses both instruction for the improvement of an individual’s
capabilities and instructing an individual for the benefit of the community.147 Further, regulations released by the Treasury Department provide a variety of examples of educational organizations
which fall within the purview of protection under Section 501(c)(3)
of the Code.148
Under the organizational test of Section 501(c)(3) of the
Code, universities meet both requirements.149 The reason being
that universities, as a part of their express purpose, are organized
for educational purposes.150 Similarly, athletic programs of the universities are considered part of the organization of a university, and
thus, meet the organizational test.151 Challenges to the concept
143. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(1)(i) (2017) (setting forth two factortest required for organizations to meet in order to be considered 501(c)(3) taxexempt eligible under the organizational test).
144. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(1)(i)(a) (2017) (stating first requirement of organizational test of 501(c)(3)).
145. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(1)(i)(b) (2017) (stating second requirement of organizational test of 501(c)(3)).
146. See Erika K. Lunder, 501(c)(3) Organizations: What Qualifies as “Educational”, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Aug. 21, 2012), available at https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R42673.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5J2-UZFM] (concluding educational
organizations meet definition of educational as exempt purpose under Section
501(c)(3)).
147. See 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(3) (2017) (stating definition of educational to encompass (1) individual instruction “for the purpose of improving or
developing his capabilities; or (2) the instruction of the public on subjects useful
to the individual and beneficial to the community”).
148. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(3)(ii) (providing examples of educational organizations, including primary or secondary schools, colleges, or professional or trade school, that have regularly scheduled curriculum and enrolled
students at location where educational activities take place).
149. See id. at 806 (finding universities and colleges meet 501(c)(3)’s organizational test).
150. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 806 (stating reasons why universities
and colleges meet 501(c)(3)’s organizational test).
151. See id. (finding universities’ athletic programs, as being part of universities’ organizations, will meet 501(c)(3)’s organizational test).
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that athletic programs are part of the university’s educational purpose have been unsuccessful as the IRS ruled that athletic programs
conduct vital functions in relation to the university’s exempted
purpose.152
The NCAA meets both requirements of the organizational test
of Section 501(c)(3) as the NCAA’s primary purpose is “maintain[ing] intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational process” and protecting a student-athlete’s ability to gain a
meaningful education.153 Further, the Code grants special requirements to specific tax-exempt organization, such as the NCAA.154
Under Section 501(j)(2) of the Code, “qualified amateur sports organizations” are defined as organizations which are established and
operate to foster amateur sports competition.155 The organizational
goal of the NCAA is to maintain the distinction between intercollegiate athletics and professional athletics.156 By maintaining this distinction, the NCAA meets one of the exempt purposes of Section
501(c)(3) of the Code, as well as qualify for special rules under Section 501(j)(2) of the Code.157
2. The Operational Test
Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, for an organization to
be considered tax-exempt, it must operate solely for one of the exempted purposes defined in Section 501(c)(3).158 This test allows
for an organization to operate a business or trade, however, the
152. See Rev. Rule. 67–291, 1967–2 C.B. 184 (concluding universities’ athletic
programs engage in activities which make athletic programs vital parts of universities’ tax-exempted educational purpose).
153. Id. (“The NCAA’s primary organizational purpose is to ‘maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete
as an integral party of the student body.’ ”).
154. See I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (2018) (codifying special rules for amateur sports
organizations).
155. I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (2018) (“[A]ny organization organized and operated
exclusively to foster national or international amateur sports competition if such
organization is also organized and operated primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports or to support and develop amateur athletes for national and international competition.”).
156. See Rev. Rule. 67–291, 1967–2 C.B. 184 (“Another of the NCAA’s purposes is to ‘retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.’ ”).
157. See id. (finding NCAA meets requirements of Section 501(c)(3) tax-exemption as NCAA’s organizational purpose is to foster national or international
amateur sports competition).
158. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1) (2017) (“An organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes
specified in section 501(c)(3).”).
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operation of the business or trade must enrich or further the exempted purpose of the organization.159 To determine whether an
organization furthers it’s primary purpose, “all the circumstances
must be considered, includ[ing] the size and the extent of the
trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which are
in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”160 Further, to be
engaged in a business or trade, “the taxpayer must be involved in
the activity with continuity and regularity and [ ] the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or
profit.”161
An example the IRS uses to illustrate this principle would be
an art museum whose primary purpose is to exhibit local artists’
works, where each piece of art displayed is offered for sale for a set
price by the artist.162 The artist would receive ninety percent of the
proceeds of the sale with the art gallery retaining the other ten percent to cover costs associated with displaying the artwork.163 Even
though the art museum collected a share of the sale, the art museum would meet the organizational test of Section 501(c)(3) because the sole purpose of the art museum is to display the works of
local artists, not to sell pieces of art.164 However, the art museum
would fail the operational test of Section 501(c)(3) since the art
museum gives a substantial portion of the benefit, the ninety percent, of its sole activity, displaying of art, to the artists.165 Under
these circumstances, the artists’ receipt of direct benefits is considered too large for the art museum to be deemed operating solely
for the art museum’s exempted purpose.166 Instead, the art museum would be considered as operating for the benefit of the art159. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(e)(1) (2017) (stating requirements necessary for exempt organizations to carry on “a trade or business”).
160. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(e)(1) (2017) (codifying ways to determine
whether exempt organizations under Section 501(c)(3) are taking necessary steps
for furtherance of their primary exempted purposes).
161. Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 807 (quoting decision reached by United
States Supreme Court of what it means to be engaged in “a business or trade”)
(citing Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987)).
162. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(iii) (2017) (stating example of art
museum in meeting Section 501(c)(3)’s operational test to determine tax-exempt
status).
163. See id. (describing payment structure of artists within example of operational test under 501(c)(3)).
164. See id. (stating example of art museum being organized for exempted
purpose as illustrated in Section 501(c)(3)).
165. See id. (finding insufficient circumstances to meet Section 501(c)(3)’s
operational test).
166. See id. (determining artists had received too large of benefit as to assume
art museum’s sole purpose was to display local artists pieces of artwork).
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ists, and the art museum would fail the operational test of Section
501(c)(3) of the Code.167
There is a general consensus that a university’s athletic program is engaged in a trade or business, as the program seeks to
make a profit.168 As such, the question is whether a university’s athletic program, operating a trade or business, contributes to the furtherance of the organizational goal of education.169 Since 1950,
Congress has maintained that a university’s athletic program is substantially related to the educational purpose of the universities.170
Further, the IRS has continued to back this Congressional position,
stating in a 1980 ruling that athletic activities further the educational purposes of universities.171 Therefore, universities meet the
operational test under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.172
To determine if the NCAA meets the operational test under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code requires a similar analysis to that of
universities.173 The NCAA’s primary purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body.”174 The
entirety of the NCAA’s activities are focused on intercollegiate athletics.175 Events such as sponsoring an intercollegiate basketball
tournament, while seen as conducting a business or trade, is in fur167. See id. (concluding art museum fails to meet operational test requirements as to grant it tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3)).
168. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 807 (“[I]t is generally assumed by many
commentators that many [athletic] programs constitute a trade or business because they seek profit.”).
169. See id. (determining that once athletic programs are characterized as
profit seeking organizations, determinations must be reached as to whether athletic programs benefit universities’ tax-exempted educational purpose under Section 501(c)(3)).
170. See id. at 807–808 (“Congress stated in 1950 that ‘athletic activities of
schools are substantially related to [the] educational functions’ of the
institutions”).
171. See id. at 808 (“In a 1980 revenue ruling, the IRS stated that ‘an athletic
program is considered to be an integral part of the educational process of the
university, and activities providing necessary services to student athletes and
coaches further the educational purposes of the university.’ ”).
172. See id. (finding lack of arguments which state that athletic programs are
not substantially related to universities’ tax-exempted educational purposes).
173. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(a)(1) (2017) (codifying that in order for
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to be granted, one’s organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more exempted purposes found in
501(c)(3)).
174. Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 809 (citing NCAA’s mission statement).
175. See id. (finding no activities which NCAA engages in which could be considered not related to intercollegiate athletics).
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therance of maintaining an athletic program.176 Congress and the
IRS have maintained the conclusion that intercollegiate athletics
are linked to the furtherance of a university’s educational purpose,
meaning all NCAA activities would meet the operational test.177
D. Strategies to Resolve Disparity Between NCAA and its
Member Universities’ Tax Exemption and the Lack of
Compensation for Student-Athletes
1. Unrelated Business Income Tax
In 1950, Congress enacted a new provision of the Code to protect both government revenue generated from corporate tax and
prohibit unfair competition between corporations and tax-exempt
organizations operating as businesses in the general marketplace.178 This provision, called the Unrelated Business Income Tax
(“UBIT”), permits the IRS to tax specific portions of a Section
501(c)(3) organization’s activities, if the specific activities satisfy
certain conditions.179 Activities which produce income from a
trade or business which is regularly carried on, but not substantially
related to, the institution’s exempt purposes is capable of being
taxed under the UBIT.180 To determine whether an activity is substantially related to the organization’s exempted purpose, a circumstantial test is utilized, which looks at factors such as the prevalence
of the activity within the organization and the level of profits the
activity makes for the organization.181
176. See id. (pointing to example of “March Madness,” NCAA’s annual men’s
basketball tournament, which although generates large profits, has stated purpose
of furthering organization of intercollegiate athletics).
177. See id. (concluding NCAA does meet Section 501(c)(3)’s operational
test).
178. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 115–16 (discussing enactment of Revenue
Act of 1950 and purpose of provision establishing UBIT).
179. See id. at 116 (stating effects of UBIT on businesses which are considered
tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3)).
180. See Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, I.R.S. Pub. No.
598, Cat. No. 46598X (Feb. 26, 2019), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p598.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A9T-CDTU] (stating definition of UBIT and
activities of Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt businesses which could be subjected to
taxation through UBIT).
181. See Erik M. Jensen, Taking the Student Out of Student Athlete: College Sports
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 31 J. TAX’N INV. 29, 38 (2014) (stating facts
and circumstances which analyze three significant factors: (1) how much profit
does potential UBIT activity generates, (2) proportionality of scope of any unrelated activities in comparison to exempted purpose of tax-exempted organizations,
and (3) whether activities of organizations are inherently part of tax-exempted
purpose of organizations).
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An example of the application of UBIT outside the context of
intercollegiate athletics would be that of a health club program organized by a Section 501(c)(3) exempted organization.182 The
charitable organization is created to provide activities for contributing to the “physical, social, mental, and spiritual health of young
people,” which grants the organization tax-exempt status under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.183 However, the organization also
runs a health club program and charges an annual fee for the program.184 Since the health club program is an addition to the taxexempt purpose of the “general physical fitness program of the organization,” the operation of the health care program would not
further the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purpose.185 As such, the annual fee for the health club program is considered unrelated business income if the organization intends to
make a profit from the annual fees, which can be taxed through the
UBIT.186
Under the UBIT, the IRS has the ability to tax a university’s
athletic department, in particular, the high revenue sports of football and men’s basketball.187 These programs clearly meet two of
the three requirements to impose the UBIT, as athletic programs
such as football and men’s basketball are conducted regularly for
the production of income.188 A similar reasoning for two of the
three requirements for the UBIT can be applied to the NCAA, as
the management and organization of intercollegiate athletics is reg182. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 598, supra note 180 (depicting example of health club
program maintained by 501(c)(3) exempt organization).
183. Id. (illustrating purpose of 501(c)(3) exempt organization within example of health care program being classified as unrelated business income).
184. See id. (describing health club program run by 501(c)(3) exempted organization in addition to general physical fitness program).
185. See id. (explaining absence of connection between accomplishment of
501(c)(3) exempted purpose of organization and annual fees collected from
health care program).
186. See id. (concluding application of UBIT to 501(c)(3) exempted organization if annual fees collected through health care program were intended to incur
profit).
187. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 135 (stating IRS’s ability to tax universities’ athletic programs by fragmenting income generated from universities’ athletic programs, specifically men’s football and men’s basketball, away from normal
operation of universities allows IRS to tax income of athletic programs).
188. See id. at 135–36 (finding two of three requirements required of UBIT,
first being that income was derived from “a trade or business” and second, that
activity is regularly carried on, can be met when analyzing universities’ athletic
programs).
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ularly done for the purpose of generating an income.189 The last
requirement, which is ambiguous in nature, is to determine
whether intercollegiate athletic revenue is substantially related to
the organization’s exempted purpose.190 However, legal precedent
and the NCAA’s maintenance that student-athletes cannot be compensated, and as such are considered amateurs, allows both institutions to avoid the UBIT by establishing substantial relation between
revenue generated by intercollegiate athletics and an organization’s
Section 501(c)(3) exempted purposes.191
2.

Conditional Antitrust Immunity for the NCAA Through the MylesBrand Act

Another proposed strategy to solve the inequitable relationship
between the revenue streams generated from intercollegiate athletics and the uncompensated labor of student-athletes is to pass legislation granting immunity from Section 1 of the Sherman Act to the
NCAA and its member universities.192 Professor Matthew Mitten
posited this could be accomplished through passage of a hypothetical legislation, called the Myles Brand Act, which would allow the
NCAA, once exempted from Section 1 of the Sherman Act, to impose financial restrictions on a university’s athletic programs.193
The imposition of federal antitrust regulations on the NCAA
and its member universities arose from court decisions applying
Section 1 of the Sherman Act to the NCAA and its member universities.194 One example of this application is found in the Tenth
189. See id. at 136 (stating NCAA’s characteristics, such as large revenues collected by NCAA and intercollegiate athletics being played throughout calendar
year, would permit IRS to utilize UBIT).
190. See id. at 138 (determining existence of uncertainty about whether revenue generated from intercollegiate athletics can be considered substantially related to continued operation of organizations’ exempted purposes).
191. See id. at 139–40 (finding operating revenue of intercollegiate athletics
can be considered substantially related to exempted purposes of universities and
NCAA through legal precedent and maintenance of amateur status for studentathletes).
192. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 838 (recommending instituting legislation which would grant immunity from federal antitrust statutes under Section 1 of
Sherman Act to NCAA and its member universities and naming this hypothetical
legislation Myles Brand Student-Athlete Education and Welfare Act (“Myles Brand
Act”)).
193. See id. (stating purpose of Myles Brand Act in reversing past precedent
whereby NCAA was denied ability to dictate such items as limitations on scholarships amounts and installing pay scale caps for intercollegiate athletic coaches in
order to curtail rising expense).
194. See id. at 829–31 (noting treatment of NCAA and its member universities
by federal appellate courts, specifically applying Sherman Act antitrust regulation
on various proposed restrictions on NCAA’s member universities).
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Circuit’s decision in Law v. NCAA.195 In that matter, the court determined that where an agreement makes price restrictions to the
competitive market, even if all parties in the market are in favor of
the agreement, the agreement is deemed anticompetitive and in
violation of antitrust legislation.196
Under the proposed Myles Brand Act legislation, and in return
for a grant of immunity from federal antitrust regulations, the
NCAA would have to provide four key benefits to student-athletes.197 First, the NCAA would guarantee that its member universities provide four-year full scholarships to student athletes, which
cover the full cost of attendance of the university.198 Second, the
NCAA and the member universities would provide free medical
care or health insurance for any sports-related injury suffered by
the student-athletes, including the ability to extend the student’s
scholarship for anytime the student-athlete is unable to attend
class.199 Third, member universities of the NCAA would have the
responsibility of identifying student-athletes who need further academic assistance and provide the required tutoring to these student-athletes.200 Fourth, the NCAA would create a postgraduate
scholarship program, funded by the revenues of the most lucrative
collegiate athletics, for those student-athletes seeking further education after their intercollegiate careers have ended.201
Past legal precedents disallowed the NCAA to impose economic restraints on its member universities, even if the NCAA’s
purpose was to protect student-athletes’ welfare and the amateur195. See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.2d 1010, 1020–21 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding NCAA’s proposition of limiting college coach’s annual salaries
are restraints of trade deemed unlawful under Section 1 of Sherman Act).
196. See id. at 1020 (stating rationale against “price-fixing” agreements because of its anticompetitive characteristics, including NCAA’s salary limitation).
197. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 838 (outlining four key components of
hypothetical legislation, Myles Brand Act, which would allow NCAA to freely manage their internal affairs, such as dictating caps on coaches’ salaries).
198. See id. at 838–39 (stating first component of Myles Brand Act, providing
four-year scholarships to student-athletes which covers full cost of attendance with
possibility of further years in order for student-athletes to complete their bachelor’s degree).
199. See id. at 840 (stating second component of Myles Brand Act, calling for
free medical care or health insurance for student-athletes for any sports-related
injury they many suffer while participating in their intercollegiate sport).
200. See id. at 840–41 (stating third component of Myles Brand Act, requiring
mandatory academic assistance to student-athletes who fall below certain academic
standards).
201. See id. at 838–41 (stating fourth component of Myles Brand Act, mandating creation of post-graduate scholarship program whereby student-athletes can
continue their education post-playing days financed through high revenue sports
such as men’s college basketball and men’s college football).
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ism of intercollegiate athletics.202 Such practices of dictating financial caps on the yearly compensation of university coaches actually
promotes competitive balance between the universities.203 Yet,
courts have held that limiting the number of nationally televised
athletic events in order to curb the commercialization of amateur
athletics, is an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act.204 The
courts rejected these practices in order to preserve a competitive
marketplace within intercollegiate athletics for consumers.205 By allowing for the exchange of improved student-athlete benefits and
the ability to be immune to past legal treatment of university regulations of the NCAA, the Myles Brand Act would seek to align the
interests of the NCAA with that of the student-athletes.206
3.

H.R. 1804: Student-Athlete Equity Act

The Student-Athlete Equity Act is a promising strategy to pursue, as it will protect many of the benefits realized by the tax-exempt status of the NCAA and its member universities, as well as
allow an equalizing treatment of student-athletes.207 The proposed
legislation, currently in the United States House of Representative’s
Ways and Means Committee, would preserve the tax-exempt status
of the NCAA and its member universities as long as student-athletes
are permitted to seek financial opportunities off the field which
utilize the student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness.208 The Act’s
202. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding NCAA
cannot impose economic restraints on member universities); see also Mitten et al.,
supra note 50, at 835–36 (finding reluctancy by NCAA to enact regulations which
would be beneficial for student-athletes’ welfare for fear of negative treatment
such regulations would receive by courts’ interpretations of antitrust policy).
203. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 830–31 (finding that economic restraints disallowed for NCAA to impose provide benefits to member universities).
204. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984) (finding NCAA violated antitrust laws by imposing restrictions on
television broadcasting rights for college football); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.2d 1010
(10th Cir. 1998) (determining NCAA cannot impose caps on salaries of coaches as
it violates antitrust laws of Sherman Act); see also Mitten et al., supra note 50, at
830–31 (describing various challenges brought by NCAA in order to impose regulations on universities’ athletic programs).
205. See id. at 830 (“The primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve a
competitive marketplace to ensure that consumers receive the benefits of economic competition.”).
206. See id. at 829 (supporting Myles Brand Act as a carrot to entice NCAA to
adopt benefits for student-athletes rather than utilize punishments such as imposing taxes on all revenue generating activities).
207. See generally Jahner, supra note 35 (reporting on new bill proposed in
Congress called Student-Athlete Equity Act, which would allow student-athletes to
be compensated for their name, image, and likeness).
208. See id. (discussing Student-Athlete Equity Act’s effects if passed by
Congress).
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compromising nature would allow the NCAA to continue to benefit
from their Section 501(c)(3) tax exemption, allowing the NCAA to
avoid conflicts between their stated purpose of promoting amateur
athletics with the increasing size of multi-million dollar broadcast
and sponsorship agreements, in exchange for removing the
NCAA’s past practice of disallowing student-athletes to financially
gain from their own name, likeness, and image off the field.209 The
NCAA’s member universities would also benefit from passage of
this legislation, as the Student-Athlete Equity Act would remove the
possibility of tax reforms which could focus not solely on the university’s athletic programs, but the tax-exempt status of the university
as a whole.210
With the decision by the NCAA to begin the process of allowing student-athletes to be compensated off the field for their
name, image, and likeness, federal legislation, such as the StudentAthlete Equity Act, becomes critically important.211 While the
NCAA seeks to finalize a policy to compensate student-athletes for
their name, image, and likeness by 2021, individual states have
started to pass legislations to allow the student-athletes of each university within that state the ability to seek off the field business opportunities.212 Further, student-athletes might not have complete
freedom to accept any opportunity, as the NCAA would only allow
student-athletes to be compensated for opportunities that are “consistent with the collegiate model.”213
As student-athletes pursue off the field opportunities, the
NCAA and its member universities would shift to weaker legal foot209. See id. (finding alteration of 501(c)(3) would allow flexibility in implementing future NCAA policy changes while also maintaining NCAA’s compliance
with tax code).
210. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 828 (finding proposed tax reform solutions to combat inequality between 501(c)(3) exempted revenues of universities
and uncompensated student athletes could result in tax punishments which would
remove all exemptions granted to universities).
211. See Khristopher J. Brooks, NCAA Athletes Getting Paid: Thousands Could Be
in Their Future, CBS NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019, 1:38 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/ncaa-athletes-getting-paid-thousands-could-be-in-their-future/ [https://
perma.cc/65RG-LUF2] (detailing NCAA’s updated policy to allow student-athletes
to be compensated for their name, image, and likeness).
212. See Colin Dwyer, NCAA Plans to Allow College Athletes To Get Paid For Use of
Their Name, Images, NPR (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/
29/774439078/ncaa-starts-process-to-allow-compensation-for-college-athletes
[https://perma.cc/E4CZ-4S5U] (describing efforts which must be undertaken in
order to allow student-athletes to take full advantage of NCAA’s new policy).
213. Brooks, supra note 211 (highlighting specific language of NCAA’s announcement which could lead to future ambiguity limiting ability of student-athletes to be compensated for their name, image, or likeness).
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ing attempting to maintain their Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.214 With the NCAA’s new policy, the IRS could possibly revisit
their prior interpretation of whether the NCAA is fostering amateur
sports competition or has shifted to fostering athletic competitions
which allow student-athletes to build their brand for off the field
business opportunities, analogous to professional athletic
leagues.215 The Student-Athlete Equity Act would be important as
it would create a federal standard, instead of fifty different state
standards, permitting student-athletes to seek off the field business
opportunities while also carving out a section in the Code permitting the NCAA and its member universities to continue to enjoy
Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.216
III.

INTRICACIES OF PREVIOUS PROPOSALS AND WHY A FEDERAL
STUDENT-ATHLETE EQUITY ACT HITS THE MARK

As intercollegiate athletics, in particular football and men’s
basketball, have become major economic powerhouses, tensions
from uncompensated student-athletes continues to rise.217 However, the ramifications of allowing student-athletes to be compensated beyond their academics creates issues with ability for the
NCAA and its member universities to qualify for a tax exemption
under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.218 This section first considers and analyzes the various ineffective solutions that have been
proposed to rectify the disconnect between the tax-exempt status of
the NCAA and its member universities with the uncompensated na214. See Michael McCann, Six Reasons to Be Skeptical of Proposals to Tax College
Athletes’ Scholarships, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/30/ncaa-name-image-likeness-tax-scholarship-richard-burr [https:/
/perma.cc/3MYA-73Y7] (identifying potential issues associated with NCAA’s new
policy and tax-exempt status of NCAA and its member universities under Section
501(c)(3)).
215. See id. (finding that “[i]f college sports competition is linked to taxation
for athletes’ identities, college sports arguably become more like pro sports. Such a
designation would undermine the valuable 501(c)(3) status enjoyed by the NCAA,
conferences and colleges”).
216. See Jahner, supra note 35 (describing goals of Student-Athlete Equity Act
and potential benefit associated with having uniform federal standard rather than
multiple standards at state level, creating potential for misunderstandings and
conflicts).
217. See Kisska-Schulze, supra note 22, at 354 (stating disconnect between student-athletes being “workhorses of successful athletic programs” and commercialization of college athletics).
218. See Rev. Rule. 67–291, 1967–2 C.B. 184 (stating one of NCAA’s tax-exempted purposes is to retain barriers between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports, where compensation above academic needs would violate that
barrier).
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ture of student-athlete labor.219 Then, this section argues in favor
of the Student-Athlete Equity Act as the preferred solution to resolve the inequitable disparity between the uncompensated labor of
student-athletes and the tax-free revenues generated by the NCAA
and university athletic programs.220
A. Finding the Right Solution to Resolve the Inequality Between
the Uncompensated Labor of Student-Athletes and the TaxExempt Status of Billion Dollar Enterprises
As the prevalence of commercialization has dominated intercollegiate athletics, critics have sought solutions to tackle the inequal disparity between the operations of the NCAA and its member
universities athletic programs as Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities and the uncompensated labor of the student-athletes.221 These
approaches seek to rectify this disparity by finding a common
ground between the Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of the organizations and the protection of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.222 However, each of these approaches have their flaws as
they attempt to stem the advancement of the tide of commercialization in intercollegiate athletics, while not protecting the studentathletes individually from this commercialization.223 Therefore,
each of the proposed solutions should be rejected in favor of the
passage of the Student-Athlete Equity Act, which would provide the
most protection to student-athletes by allowing them to seek compensation for their own name, image, and likeness.224
219. For further discussion of theories to resolve disconnect between tax-exempt organizations and compensation of student-athletes, see supra notes 181–219
and accompanying text.
220. For further discussion of the benefits and effects of the passage of the
Student-Athlete Equity Act, see infra notes 254–278 and accompanying text.
221. For further discussion of the solutions proposed by critics of the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, see supra notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
222. For further discussion of the details of the proposed solutions to combat
the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, see supra notes 181–219 and accompanying text.
223. For further discussion of the flaws which accompany each of the proposed solutions and the inefficient means they would produce in protecting the
interests of the student-athletes, see infra notes 228–253 and accompanying text.
224. For further discussion of the reasoning each of the proposed solutions to
combat the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics should be rejected, see
infra notes 228–253 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss2/4

34

Kurrass: The Swelling Tide Of Commercialized Amateur Athletics: How Growin

2020] SWELLING TIDE
1.

OF

COMMERCIALIZED AMATEUR ATHLETICS 319

Issues of UBIT’s Application: “The Paper Tiger Problem”

Under the UBIT approach, the IRS would be allowed to tax
activities that are being carried out by Section 501(c)(3) exempt
organizations if the activities satisfied certain conditions.225 The
UBIT would apply to activities that produce income from a trade or
business of a Section 501(c)(3) exempted organization, that is regularly carried on by the organization, but is not substantially related
to the organization’s tax-exempted purpose.226 Applying the UBIT
to either the NCAA, its member universities, or both, would require
each organization to demonstrate how their revenue generating activities are substantially related to their Section 501(c)(3) exempted
purpose.227
With the exempted purpose of fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and to avoid the UBIT, the
NCAA would be required to demonstrate how certain business relationships, such as their broadcasting agreement, substantially relate
to their exempted purpose.228 If these business relationships are
being utilized in a similar fashion to those business relationships
usually reserved for professional sports leagues, such as exclusive
media agreements between a team and a media company, than the
NCAA would fail the substantial relation requirement and the
UBIT would be applied to the NCAA’s revenue.229 However, if the
business relationships are being utilized to promote amateurism in
intercollegiate athletics and further the education of the student-

225. See Columbo, supra note 20, at 116 (stating definition of UBIT on businesses which are considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3)).
226. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 598, supra note 180 (stating definition of UBIT and
activities of Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt businesses which could be subjected to
taxation through UBIT).
227. See id. (identifying requirements in applying UBIT that one’s business
activity must be substantially related and contribute importantly to accomplish organizations’ tax-exempted purposes under Section 501(c)(3)).
228. See I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (2018) (codifying qualified amateur sports organizations, under which NCAA falls, which would meet requirements of 501(c)(3) as
tax-exempted organizations); see also Colombo, supra note 20, at 139 (discussing
methods by which NCAA could avoid targeted taxation through UBIT of revenue
generated from television contracts).
229. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 139 (stating viewpoint that continued use
of NCAA’s media agreements would be considered within same vein as network
agreements of professional sports leagues, and revenue collected from NCAA’s
media agreements would not be considered to be substantially related to NCAA’s
exempted purpose).
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athletes, the commercial hue of the activities are overlooked and
the substantial relation requirement is met.230
Universities would undergo a similar analysis regarding the
characterization of the revenue generated from their athletic programs.231 Proponents of applying the UBIT to revenue generated
from athletic programs of universities point to factors such as the
treatment that student-athletes receive from the university which
can hinder their education.232 Conversely, there are factors which
universities point to that demonstrate the benefits of successful athletic programs such as larger and more frequent contributions from
donors to provide high quality educational tools.233 However, legal
precedents and IRS rulings have characterized the athletic activities
of schools as being substantially related to the educational purpose
of the university.234
However, proponents of the UBIT overlook a central flaw of
utilizing the UBIT to eradicate the disparity between the large revenues generated from intercollegiate athletics and the uncompensated labor of student-athletes, known as the “Paper Tiger
Problem.”235 The flaw lies with accounting principles, in particular
accounting for capital costs and other costs associated with intercollegiate athletics.236 For the NCAA, after distributions have been
230. See id. at 140 (providing counterpoints that promotion of amateur athletics is still being acted upon by NCAA with NCAA’s emphasis on student-athletes’
education even if revenue generating activities are commercial in nature).
231. See id. at 139–40 (comparing universities’ abilities to that of NCAA’s abilities to determine whether revenue generated from universities’ athletic programs
are constituted as substantially related to further universities’ 501(c)(3) tax-exempted educational purpose).
232. See id. (citing to student-athletes being separated from everyday academic activities of normal student, with heavy emphasis on practice within the student-athletes respected sport versus education and comparing rates of graduation
among student-athletes to graduation rates of general student body).
233. See id. at 140 (citing to increased donor activity with successful athletic
programs as well as comparing expensive laboratories benefiting only small number of students who use those facilities with benefits of successful athletic programs
providing its own benefits to small subset of students, student-athletes).
234. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 816 (stating language of IRS’s ruling
and legal precedent which has allowed universities to circumvent UBIT in respect
to their revenue generated from universities’ athletic programs).
235. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 142 (labeling flaws in applying UBIT to
revenue generated from intercollegiate athletics where use of cost accounting
principles creates situations where either no profit or very minimal profits exists
associated with intercollegiate collegiate events for universities, and as such, UBIT
could not be applied to tax nothing).
236. See id. at 144 (describing “Paper Tiger Problem” whereby using cost accounting principles, there would exist either no profit or very minimal profit associated with operating revenue generating intercollegiate athletic events, and UBIT
cannot be applied to tax nothing).
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made to the member universities and the costs associated with the
organization have been taken into account, the amount the NCAA
would actually pay is minimal.237 Further, with knowledge of the
UBIT, the NCAA could create a successful tax structure to ensure
they have no business revenue to be taxed.238 For the universities,
expenditures for the athletic facilities as well as general maintenance costs of running an athletic program effectively removes all
profit from these programs.239 As such, no program would show an
actual profit from the athletic program, and applying the UBIT to
tax an amount which is nonexistent would not work.240 Therefore,
after considering cost accounting and the foresight to create a tax
structure to avoid the UBIT, the UBIT would be rendered
ineffectual.241
2.

Missing the Target: Issues of the Myles Brand Act

Professor Mitten’s hypothetical Myles Brand Act would seek to
solve the disparity between the increasing revenues of intercollegiate athletics and the lack of equity for student-athletes by granting
immunity from Section 1 of the Sherman Act for the NCAA and its
member universities.242 While many of the requirements of the
Myles Brand Act would advance some of the best interests of the
student-athletes, such as medical insurance and a post-graduation
scholarship fund for further education, the focus is still in maintain237. See id. at 143 (finding after expenses have been deducted from NCAA
and its member universities have received their distributions from NCAA, there
would exist either very little tax base, if any, for NCAA to pay under UBIT).
238. See id. (“[M]inimal tax planning could easily unsure that the NCAA has
no net business revenues to tax.”).
239. See id. at 144 (finding universities’ expenditures on athletic programs
would substantially reduce revenues collected from athletic programs as to cause
UBIT to tax nonexistent revenue).
240. See id. (“What can be said with confidence is that taking account of the
imbedded capital costs of athletic facilities would surely reverse any appearance of
financial ‘profit’ associated with even the most successful big-time program.”
(quoting James Shulman & William Bowen, The Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values (2001))).
241. See Colombo, supra note 20, at 145 (concluding application of UBIT
would produce results which proponents of UBIT would find lacking beneficial
power in order to stem tide of commercialization of intercollegiate athletics).
242. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 838 (recommending instituting legislation which would grant immunity from federal antitrust statutes under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act to NCAA and its member universities and naming this hypothetical legislation Myles Brand Student-Athlete Education and Welfare Act (“Myles
Brand Act”)).
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ing control of student-athletes for the NCAA.243 While certain components enrich the student-athletes, it does not provide an
equitable exchange for the physical labor and time commitment
student-athletes must sacrifice to generate large revenues of athletics programs and the NCAA.244 Solutions, such as the hypothetical
Myles Brand Act, operate under the assumption that amateurism
and collegial emphasis are the primary goal of a university’s athletic
program and the NCAA, instead of the pursuit of maximizing revenue.245 As such, these solutions continue to limit student-athletes
from receiving compensation for their physical labor and time commitment and instead be given something similar to employment
benefits, which falls short in value compared to the revenues collected by the NCAA and its member universities.246
Solutions, such as the hypothetical Myles Brand Act, reinforce
the ideals of amateurism by disallowing payments to student-athletes, but provide increased student-athlete welfare in exchange for
antitrust immunity for the NCAA.247 However, these solutions are
overlooking the wave of commercialization currently prevalent
throughout intercollegiate athletics, characterized by the businesscentric approach of the NCAA and its member universities to seek
revenue maximization.248 Instead of providing a crutch for amateurism through an increase in student-athlete welfare, a complete
overhaul of the incentives of the NCAA and its member universities
must be acted upon.249 This can be achieved through passage of
243. See Chambers, supra note 33 (quoting Cal. State Senator Kevin Murray’s
criticism of NCAA’s attempt to increase student-athlete welfare as designed to
“keep the student under the thumb of the N.C.A.A. for the N.C.A.A.’s profit”).
244. See id. (discussing unequal exchange student-athletes would receive from
creation of welfare requirements in comparison to “the way [money] is distributed
based upon who contributes to it”).
245. See id. (stating viewpoint of “contemporary version of university athletics
as a collegial model, one that permits enhanced financial aid but does not allow
athletes to be paid salaries”).
246. See Mitten et al., supra note 50, at 838 (finding best solution to inequality
between student-athletes and large revenue streams of NCAA and its member universities is through implementation of student-athlete welfare policies).
247. See id. (stating recommendation by article’s Authors to institute legislation, hypothetically called Myles Brand Act, which provides increased demands to
student-athlete welfare in exchange for antitrust immunity of NCAA and its members universities instead of compensating student-athletes).
248. For further discussion of the growth of the business of the NCAA and its
member universities, see supra notes 1–6 and accompany text.
249. See Jeremy Sheff, The Well-Intended But Misguided Student-Athlete Equity Act,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-wellintended-but-misguided-student-athlete-equity-act/ (finding student-athlete tuition
and scholarship funds pale in comparison to payments made to athletic staff and
collected by revenues of universities’ athletic programs and NCAA).
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federal legislation, specifically the Student-Athlete Equity Act,
which would provide the opportunity for student-athletes to be
compensated for the labor and time commitment off the field from
the reputation they build on the field.250
B. Riding the Swelling Tide of Professionalization of
Intercollegiate Athletics: The Benefits and Effects of
Passage of the Student-Athlete Equity Act
Theories to combat the inequitable disparity between tax-exempted revenues collected through the uncompensated labor of
student-athletes receive mixed reviews on whether they present an
adequate solution.251 The solution that provides the most comprehensive protection to student-athletes and protects the tax-exempt
status of universities and the NCAA is currently in the United States
House of Representative’s Ways and Means Committee.252 The Student-Athlete Equity Act would call for an amendment to Section
501(j)(2) of the Code which provides rules for amateur sports organizations applying for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.253 This solution
would allow student-athletes to use their name, image, and likeness
for commercial gain, essentially allowing student-athletes to be contractors to the NCAA and the universities.254 This would preserve
the ability of the NCAA and the universities to continue as
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations while allowing student-athletes
to be compensated for their labor and time.255
If passed, the Student-Athlete Equity Act would amend Section
501(j)(2) to include a clause which would remove tax-exempt status
from organizations which fail to adhere to the amendment.256 The
250. See id. (stating Student-Athlete Equity Act provides ability for studentathletes to “profit off the field or from the fame they win on the field” by allowing
student-athletes to be compensated for their likeness and image).
251. For further discussion of the various theories and criticisms against the
theories, see supra notes 220–253 and accompanying text.
252. See U.S. Congress, H.R.1804 – Student-Athlete Equity Act, CONGRESS.GOV
(Jan. 21, 2020, 8:51 AM), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/1804/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22student-athlete+equity+
act%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=1 [https://perma.cc/7XJ7-WB2C?type=image] [hereinafter “Student-Athlete Equity Act”] (stating current status of H.R.1804 within Congressional approval process).
253. See id. (stating consequences to Code if Student-Athlete Equity Act is
passed).
254. See id. (stating ramifications to student-athletes under passage of Student-Athlete Equity Act).
255. See id. (stating outcome of Student-Athlete Equity Act to universities and
NCAA if Act is passed by Congress).
256. See id. (describing method by which Student-Athlete Equity Act would
alter Section 501(c)(3) by introducing new language).
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amended Section 501(j)(2) exemption would forbid tax exemptions from those Section 501(c)(3) organizations that, “substantially
restrict[s] a student athlete from using, or being reasonably compensated for the third party use of, the name, image, or likeness of
such student athlete.”257 The new requirements would force the
NCAA to choose whether to keep their tax exemption or to alter
their definition of amateurism to allow student-athletes to arrange
financial agreements for their names, images, and likenesses.258
However, the Student-Athlete Equity Act does not call for universities to compensate their student-athletes, only grant student-athletes the ability to solicit and agree to compensation agreements off
the field.259
Similar solutions to the Student-Athlete Equity Act have been
reached in states such as California, whose State Legislature passed
Senate Bill 206 in September 2019.260 The California Senate Bill
would allow student-athletes to use their name, image, or likeness
to generate compensation from commercial outlets.261 The emphasis of the bill is to lessen the gap between large revenues of college athletics and the lack of compensation afforded to studentathletes.262 Issues that could arise with the passage of this bill is
that it directly goes against the current NCAA’s bylaws, making student-athletes who sell their name, likeness, or image ineligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics.263 Further, the California
257. Id. (quoting language of Student-Athlete Equity Act).
258. See Sheff, supra note 249 (“[The Student-Athlete Equity Act] purports to
require the NCAA to choose between its federal tax exemption and those aspects
of its amateurism rules that forbid student-athletes from making endorsement
deals, entering merchandising contracts, or licensing their names, images, and
likenesses to video game companies.”).
259. See id. (“What [the Student-Athlete Equity Act] would not do is require
(or, indeed, permit) the athletic programs in which these student-athletes compete to compensate them for their labor.”).
260. See Melody Gutierrez & Nathan Fenno, California Would Allow College Athletes to Profit From Endorsements Under Bill Sent to Newsom, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-11/california-college-athletes-endorsements-bill [https://perma.cc/LU6D-2CWA?type=image] (reporting California State Senate Bill 206 passed, allowing college athletes to profit
from their image and likeness).
261. See id. (“The bill would not allow schools to directly pay athletes but
would permit students to receive compensation from outside sources – for example, from a video game company or for signing autographs or memorabilia.”).
262. See id. (documenting praise California bill has garnered from prominent
athletes for allowing student-athletes to gain economically from their labor they
supplied to universities and NCAA).
263. See Louise Radnofsky & Alejandro Lazo, California Takes Aim at NCAA Pay
Ban, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2019, 7:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-takes-aim-at-ncaa-pay-ban-11568244553 [https://perma.cc/7SP6Z2L4?type=image] (providing statements from universities within California that
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bill would be challenged constitutionally, as it could be attempting
to regulate interstate commerce.264 While the bill illustrates the political climate on the issue of student-athlete compensation in the
face of commercialized intercollegiate athletics, it was generated in
the wrong forum.265
The most effective legal forum to pass a bill or an act similar to
California’s would be through federal legislation, not a state by
state legislative adoption.266 Currently, legislation, such as California’s, will be challenged as unduly interfering with interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.267 The NCAA would claim that in order to comply
with California’s new legal requirements, the organization would be
forced to adopt and enforce an updated national rule to other universities across the country.268 This would be a violation of the
Commerce Clause, as it effectively allows California to regulate the
commercial activity of other States.269
Instead, in order to force the NCAA’s hand in overturning
their bylaws which disallow student-athletes from being compensated for their name, likeness, or image, federal legislation is renoted the bill would encourage student-athletes to expressly violate NCAA bylaws
against compensation being provided to student-athletes for their name, likeness,
or image, which would result in student-athletes found in violation being ineligible
to participate in intercollegiate athletics); but cf. Murphy, supra note 80 (detailing
changes which NCAA intends to implement for 2021–22 academic year allowing
student-athletes to seek third-party endorsement opportunities).
264. See Radnofsky & Lazo, supra note 263 (finding courts will most likely side
with NCAA as “the U.S. Constitution generally bars states from enacting laws seeking to regulate interstate commerce”).
265. See id. (detailing March 2019 lawsuit in Oakland, California seeking to
disallow NCAA limitations on compensation or benefits for student-athletes to just
those costs associated with educational needs and cost of attendance).
266. See Michael McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, but a Federal
Law is What They Should Fear, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 4, 2019), https://
www.si.com/college/2019/10/04/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act-name-likeness-imagelaws [https://perma.cc/HQJ6-NKBR] (describing persuasive argument NCAA
could make if more states passed legislation similar to that of California instead of
federal regulation being passed).
267. See Michael McCann, What’s Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair
Pay to Play Act Into Law, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/
college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-to-play-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12 [https://
perma.cc/R6HN-ZCJ8] (stating legal argument NCAA will utilize if states pass similar legislation to California’s, with likelihood of NCAA overturning various state’s
legislation).
268. See id. (“If the Fair Pay to Play Act goes into effect, it would . . . force the
NCAA to change its national rules so that they match those in California . . . allow
California schools to play by different rules or expel California schools.”).
269. See id. (stating legal grounds for which NCAA could dismiss or overturn
current and future state legislation allowing student-athletes in that particular state
to be compensated off field for their names, likeness, or image).
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quired instead of a state-by-state legislative adoption strategy.270
This can be done with an amendment to the Code through the
Student-Athlete Equity Act.271 Passage of the Student-Athlete Equity Act would circumvent legal arguments which would arise on
the part of the NCAA claiming violations of the Commerce
Clause.272 Further, the Student-Athlete Equity Act would provide
an incentive for the NCAA to maintain tax-exempt revenues, in particular their broadcast agreements, the NCAA would not be able to
prohibit a student-athlete from capitalizing on opportunities generated off the field from these broadcast agreements.273 For example, student-athletes would now have ability to seek fair
compensation off the field for their time and efforts within revenue
generating athletic events of the NCAA and their respective universities.274 In essence, it would allow student-athletes to profit off the
field from their efforts on the field by incentivizing the NCAA’s tax
exemption.275
IV. REACHING

A

SOLUTION: PROTECTING BOTH STUDENT-ATHLETES
NCAA’S TAX-EXEMPT STATUS

AND

Intercollegiate athletics were primarily founded on the principle of amateurism, appealing to the vision that competition should
be for the sake of competition.276 However, over the course of the
twentieth century, commercialization of intercollegiate athletics has
become prevalent due to the availability of broadcasting rights and
corporate sponsorship agreements.277 As universities and the
NCAA collected more revenue from these agreements, the United
270. See id. (finding federal legislation as most effective measure to ensure
compensation system similar to that which California passed).
271. See Student-Athlete Equity Act, supra note 252 (adjusting 501(c)(3) to
reflect increased protections to student-athletes, allowing them to be compensated
for their likeness, name, or image).
272. See McCann, supra note 266 (“[T]he NCAA could not credibly argue that
multiple states are forcing it into a confused and conflicting set of rules. A federal
law would set the rules for all states.”).
273. See Sheff, supra note 249 (stating Student-Athlete Equity Act would require NCAA to decide whether to maintain their tax-exempt status or loosen their
definition of amateurism for student-athletes).
274. See id. (describing Student-Athlete Equity Act as allowing student-athletes
to be able to sell their name, image, or likeness by removing fear they might lose
their athletic eligibility).
275. See id. (describing ability of Student-Athlete Equity Act to allow studentathletes to capitalize from successes on-field to fair compensation off-field).
276. For further discussion of the beginnings of intercollegiate athletics with
an emphasis on amateurism, see supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
277. For further discussion of growth of commercialization of intercollegiate
athletics, see supra notes 58–71 and accompanying text.
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States Tax Code lagged behind in the treatment of these revenues.278 This has allowed the NCAA and its member universities to
be given favorable treatment by both the courts and the IRS in preserving their 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.279
In recent years, critics have questioned whether the NCAA and
its member universities’ athletic programs are operating solely for
the purpose of fostering amateurism or purely to achieve revenue
maximization.280 Determination of the purpose of the NCAA and
its member universities would have significant effect on the organization’s tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3) of the Code.281 Further,
critics cite the diminishing importance of the academics which student-athletes are subjected to by the NCAA and its member universities.282 Various solutions have been proposed to resolve the
inequal disparity between the untaxed revenues of the NCAA and
its member universities with the uncompensated labor of studentathletes.283 However, each solution fails to provide adequate protection to student-athletes.284
The most equitable solution to resolve the disparity of the ever
increasing revenue streams and uncompensated labor of studentathletes is passing an amendment to the Code through the Student278. For further discussion of tax treatment of the NCAA and its member
universities over time, see supra notes 103-143 and accompanying text.
279. See Will Hobson, Happy Tax Day! Here’s Why the NFL and NCAA Aren’t
Sweating It, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
sports/wp/2015/04/15/happy-tax-day-heres-why-the-nfl-and-ncaa-arent-sweatingit/ [https://perma.cc/DL7C-J5N4?type=image] (describing similar tax-exempt status NCAA has compared to charities and advocacy groups, such as Amnesty International, Red Cross, and Salvation Army). For further discussion of precedents
establishing favorable tax-exempt treatment of the NCAA and its member universities, see supra notes 127–143 and accompanying text.
280. For further discussion of criticisms of revenue maximizations habits of
the NCAA and its member universities, see supra notes 11–17 and accompanying
text.
281. For further discussion of eligibility of Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, see supra notes 144–180 and accompanying text.
282. See, Jonathan R. Cole, Why Sports and Elite Academics Do Not Mix, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/
03/the-case-against-student-athletes/518739/ [https://perma.cc/99XK-A95Q]
(describing “broken higher-education experiences” student-athletes undergo, as
seen by not only University of North Carolina scandal but “one-and-done” in men’s
college basketball and various sexual and inappropriate conduct of collegiate
teams). For further discussion of diminishing academic value of student-athletes,
see supra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
283. For further discussion of proposed solutions, see supra notes 181–219
and accompanying text.
284. For further discussion of criticisms of proposed solutions, see supra notes
228–253 and accompanying text.
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Athlete Equity Act.285 Recently, various states passed or have
sought to pass legislation which would afford similar protections to
student-athletes as the Student-Athlete Equity Act.286 However,
each of these legislations will be met with intensive legal challenges
brought by the NCAA.287 Rather than adopt a state-by-state legislation for student-athletes, the Student-Athlete Equity Act would provide a tax exemption incentive structure across all states that would
encourage the NCAA to allow student-athletes to seek fair compensation off the field.288 Amateurism may still be idealized in intercollegiate athletics, however, the reality of commercialization must be
faced and protections created for student-athletes.289
Benjamin Kurrass*
285. For further discussion of the most equitable solution to solve the disparity between large revenues of the NCAA and its member universities with the uncompensated labor of student-athletes, see supra notes 254–278 and accompanying
text.
286. See Gutierrez & Fenno, supra note 260 (detailing latest legislation passed
by California State Legislature).
287. See McCann, supra note 267 (stating various legal challenges which
NCAA will most likely argue in order to overturn state-by-state legislation in favor
of allowing student-athletes to sell their names, images, and likenesses).
288. For further discussion on the incentives of the Student-Athlete Equity
Act would create, see supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
289. See McCann, supra note 267 (describing agreement among Congressmen
to promote legislation to further protect student-athletes from capitalistic treatment of intercollegiate athletics by NCAA and its member universities).
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Economics, Political Science, Bucknell University, 2015.
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